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Using data from a recent nationwide survey, we provide the first analysis of the supporter base of 
the Alternative for Germany (AfD) since the party’s split and ideological re-orientation in mid-
2015. Hypotheses are derived from the literature on Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) in 
Western Europe. Our findings indicate that AfD support—despite the party’s euro crisis origins 
and rapid organizational and ideational changes—is by now due to largely the same set of socio-
economic, attitudinal and contextual factors proven important for PRRP parties elsewhere. Right-
wing political attitudes concerning immigration, political distrust, fears of personal economic 
decline, as well as gender and socialisation effects are the most relevant explanatory variables. 
However, some of our findings – the importance of right-wing economic policy preferences, the 
strong support by certain immigrant groups, and the role of the long-term regional political 






Founded in early 2013, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has already become one of the most 
successful newly founded parties in Germany for decades. While the party narrowly failed to pass 
the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation in its first Bundestag election in 2013, it gained 
7.1% of all votes in the European Parliament election of 2014. On the sub national level, AfD 
candidates have already been elected to 14 out of 16 regional Länder parliaments and several 
local municipalities. Eventually, and notwithstanding serious internal disputes about personal and 
programmatic strategy, the AfD established itself on the national level gaining 12.6 % of all votes 
in the federal election of September 2017 – the best result of any party newly entering the 
Bundestag since 1949.  
From its start, the nature of AfD has been subject to intense public debate. Starting with 
its central demand to end Germany’s contributions to the EU’s financial rescue packages, the 
party was gradually suspected of advocating radical right-wing positions with regard to questions 
of immigration and integration, including the closing of German borders to asylum seekers, a ban 
on mosques, and several repatriation and chauvinist welfare demands (Franzmann, 2016a, 2016b; 
Lewandowsky, 2015; Berbuir et al., 2015). This eventual combination of Euro-sceptic, anti-
immigrant, and culturally conservative positions, combined with a pronounced populist rhetoric, 
has resulted in harsh verbal reactions from mainstream politicians, including comparisons of the 
AfD’s programmatic with that of National Socialism (Spiegel Online, 2016a).  
  Naturally, the AfD has also raised considerable interest from political scientists. So far, 
academia has mainly followed the public discourse and paid attention to the programmatic 
character and development of the party itself, trying to classify it as Euro-sceptic, populist, 
national-conservative, nativist, radical or even extreme right (Arzheimer, 2015; Berbuir et al., 
2015; Franzmann, 2016a; Lewandowsky et al. 2016; Niedermayer, 2015). Importantly, AfD 
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started with a different leadership and programmatic focus compared to what we observe for the 
years 2015 and 2016. It arose in the context of the euro crisis and was initially guided by 
euroskepticism together with market-liberal ideas and leadership. More recently, the party split 
and changed more clearly in a radical right direction, with an agenda emphasizing above all 
resistance to immigration in the wake of Germany’s “refugee crisis.” It now seems clear that the 
AfD has ended Germany’s rare status as a Western European polity lacking a significant Populist 
Radical Right Party (PRRP). 
While these developments in organisation and agenda are well-documented, we know less 
about the individual level factors behind AfD‘s electoral support. Only a few studies have 
addressed this issue (Berbuir et al., 2015; Schmitt-Beck, 2014, 2017) and such analyses have 
been restricted by low numbers of respondents, potential sample bias and – most importantly – by 
the rapidly changing character of the AfD itself. Thus, we need to know more about whether the 
factors behind the party’s electoral support are by now the same as those demonstrated for PRRPs 
elsewhere. In the following, we offer the first nationwide analysis of AfD supporters after the 
split and programmatic re-orientation of the party in mid-2015. From a panel survey in May 
2016, we are not only able to identify the socio-economic profile and political motivations of 
AfD supporters, but also to analyse the impact of contextual variables. Deriving our theoretical 
expectations from the literature on the voters of PRRPs in Western Europe, we seek to draw a 
comprehensive picture of AfD supporters and their current motivations.  
The next section presents a summary of the short but turbulent history of the AfD since its 
foundation in 2013. We then summarise the theoretical arguments for the typical drivers of PRRP 
support in Western Europe, distinguishing between individual and contextual-level explanations. 
After describing and eventually analyzing our data, we conclude that AfD support can be 
relatively well explained by variables drawn from the literature on PRRP support in Western 
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Europe. However, some of our findings – the importance of anti-redistribution economic policy 
preferences, the strong support by certain immigrant groups, and the role of the long-term 
regional political context – stand out and distinguish the AfD from other Western European 
PRRPs. Finally, we discuss the party’s future electoral fortunes in the concluding section.  
The AfD from 2013 to 2016 
Until very recently and in contrast to many other countries of Western Europe, parties of the far-
right have had a difficult time in the German electoral market. Surely, Germany’s 20
th
 century 
history explains, to a great extent, the low appeal of any right-wing ideology in the mainstream. 
Not only were the devastating experiences of the Nazi regime still alive in the early years of the 
German Republic, but also in the following decades Germany’s role in European history, and 
especially its war crimes, were frequently discussed with a great deal of public attention. Shortly 
after German reunification, politically motivated assaults on asylum seekers again resulted in 
debates about the lessons learned from the Nazi era – debates strongly linked to questions of 
immigration and integration policies. As a result of these intensely fought debates about ways of 
‘coming to terms with the past’, any right-wing political party risks being compared with, or 
equated to, the Nazi ideology – a capital charge in German politics. Because of this 
extraordinarily critical public climate, openly racist, xenophobic and even nationalistic parties 
such as the Republicans, the National Democratic Party of Germany, and the German People's 
Union never managed to enter the national parliament, despite some electoral successes on the 
sub national level.  
 It is in this climate that the AfD entered German politics in 2013. However, the early AfD 
did not draw attention to itself with a political agenda that focused on a set of core radical right 
issues but with a critical stance on another of German politics’ holy cows: EU membership. 
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Highly critical of Germany’s financial guarantees to Greece and other EU member states during 
the European financial crisis, the AfD took a stance strictly separating it from any other party 
represented in the Bundestag, It demanded an end to Germany’s participation in the Euro and the 
re-introduction of the Deutsche Mark, an end to using taxpayers’ money to bail out banks or 
member states, and finally it demanded the ‘orderly dissolution of the Eurozone’ (Berbuir et al., 
2015; Arzheimer, 2015; Schmitt-Beck, 2014). The main advocate of this political agenda was a 
newcomer to German politics: Bernd Lucke, a professor of economics with a pronounced market-
liberal stance and very present in the German media during the months of the financial crisis in 
2013. Together with some former second-ranking Christian Democratic Union (CDU) members, 
including the national-conservative politician and newspaper publisher Alexander Gauland, 
Lucke founded the AfD in February 2013. Nearly exclusively focusing on an agenda of soft 
Euro-scepticism, the party was not only able to win 4.7% of the votes in the Bundestag election 
of 2013, but also 7.4% of the votes in the election for the European Parliament in 2014. By then, 
Hans-Olaf Henkel, former chairman of the Federation of German Industries and another 
prominent advocate of a more market-liberal German political economy, had also joined the AfD.  
 Like many other newly founded parties, the AfD was soon plagued by internal disputes 
about candidates and programmatic decisions. However, in AfD’s case these conflicts were 
fought with great intensity. Internal conflicts had already started in 2014 when the party had to 
decide which EP faction it wished to join; economic liberals like Lucke and Henkel favoured the 
conservatives while some sub national leaders favoured a closer alliance with parties such as the 
United Kingdom Independence Party or France’s Front National. While Lucke decided this 
debate in his favour, it became very clear that two factions existed inside the AfD: one market-
liberal faction with Euro-scepticism as its dominant issue, and one national-conservative faction, 
increasingly focusing on the issue of immigration (Franzmann, 2016a; Lewandowsky, 2015; 
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Berbuir et al., 2015). After the election to the EP in May 2014, the national-conservative group 
gained influence and the AfD was able to enter two additional sub national parliaments with 
campaigns focusing on this new agenda (Franzmann, 2016a).  
The question of how to position the AfD with regard to the issue of immigration, and the 
internal disputes about the exceptional status of founder Bernd Lucke inside the AfD, culminated 
in the party congress of July 2015. Before this meeting, Lucke publicly urged AfD members not 
to follow a strategy characterised by ‘system-critical, fundamentally oppositional and 
nationalistic’ demands, and to stick to the much more moderate party platforms formulated for 
the last Bundestag and EP elections (Zeit Online, 2015). However, Lucke clearly lost the election 
to the AfD’s federal spokesman against national-conservative candidate Frauke Petry. As a 
reaction to this, within two weeks Lucke declared his split from the AfD and founded the 
Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA) as a splinter group of the AfD. The factional dispute 
was thus solved in favour of the national conservatives.  
Many observers saw the AfD as being paralysed by these internal divisions and by the 
separation of ALFA, but such forecasts soon proved to be wrong. While ALFA has recently 
played the role of a splinter party in German politics, since mid-2015 the AfD has been able to 
rapidly increase its supporter base, especially – but by no means exclusively – in Eastern 
Germany. Since July 2015, the start of the German ‘refugee crisis’, the party’s popularity rose 
from 3% to 11% in national surveys and was able to enter several sub national parliaments, with 
vote shares between 5.5% (Bremen) and 24.3% (Saxony-Anhalt). This electoral increase was 
accompanied by a further radicalisation of the AfD, including the recent statement of AfD 
chairman Jörg Meuthen to break with the consensus not to cooperate with the extreme right 
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National Democratic Party (NPD)
1
 in the event of being elected to the parliament of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (Spiegel Online, 2016b).  
Understanding the nature of AfD 
As this short history of the AfD illustrates, the party started as a Euro-sceptic and market-liberal, 
single-issue party in 2013 but very quickly developed a programme that focuses closely on the 
topics of immigration and asylum rights. At both of these stages of its development, the party has 
been described as following a populist approach to politics, dividing the world into the common 
people versus either a bureaucratic and undemocratic political elite residing in Brussels and 
Berlin, or into German nationals versus immigrants and asylum seekers (Berbuir et al., 2015; 
Lewandowsky, 2015). 
This more recent mix of national, anti-immigrant and populist appeal is not new to 
Western European politics and has motivated an encompassing literature (see the reviews in: Van 
der Brug & Fennema, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009) on who votes for ‘populist’ 
(Mudde, 2007), ‘radical right’ (Kitschelt, 1995), ‘extreme right’ (Arzheimer, 2009) or ‘anti-
immigrant’ (Van der Brug et al., 2005) parties.
2
 The previous section described how the AfD 
itself has made decisive moves in the direction of this party family. But because of the rapid 
nature of these still ongoing changes we presently know too little about the individual level 
                                                          
1
 The NPD has just survived its second party ban proceeding before the German Federal Constitutional 
Court. Although the NPD was regarded as anti-constitutional and related to national socialism, the court 
was convinced that the party did not have the potential to eliminate democracy in Germany. The 
application to ban the NPD as a political party was therefore denied (Federal Constitutional Court, 2017).  
2
 Given the diversity of labels for parties in the same family, it should be noted that the discussion about 
the most suitable term is indeed often ‘a question of labels not of substance’ (Giugni & Koopmans, 2007: 
489). We agree with this statement as the use of different labels rarely results in a disagreement over 
which parties should be regarded as PRRPs – the term we use in this article.  
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factors that are now driving AfD‘s electoral support. Are the factors behind the party’s electoral 
support by now the same as those demonstrated for PRRPs elsewhere? 
This section, then, discusses the comparative literature on the voters of PRRPs and 
derives from this literature a series of possible explanatory variables to be examined in the 
empirical analysis. Specifically, we first identify the socio-economic profile of AfD supporters. 
Next, we add politically relevant attitudes - anti-immigrant sentiments but also economic policy 
preferences - and protest motives to this. Finally, we add contextual factors to the list of potential 
explanations, most prominently immigration, economic conditions, and the long-term regional 
political context. For each group of explanatory variables, we also summarise the results of 
previous studies of the AfD’s electoral support base.  
Socio-economic status and risks 
Starting with the individual drivers, earlier studies have stressed that PRRPs draw support from 
voters with a clearly defined socio-economic profile (Kitschelt, 1995; Betz, 1993). As far as 
demographics are concerned, time and again research has reported that men are much more likely 
to support PRRPs than women. Also, the radical right draws disproportionately strong support 
from voters of younger and older age groups, while it is under-represented among middle-aged 
voters (for many: Van der Brug et al., 2005).  
Regarding social status, previous studies have also claimed that lower social strata are 
more likely to vote for PRRPs; most prominently, Georg Betz has described the supporters of the 
radical right as the ‘losers of modernity’ (Betz, 1994: 25). In this view, PRRP supporters are 
poorly educated, and either unemployed or at least severely threatened by unemployment and 
economic decline (Lubbers et al., 2002; Rydgren, 2004; Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2005). 
Working in low-skilled, low-paid jobs in the manufacturing sector, or being members of the petit 
bourgoisie (artisans, small shop-owners and independents), both social groups are in a socio-
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economic position very comparable to that of immigrants. Therefore, they are expected to 
perceive the new arrivals as a threat to their own economic well-being, as they have to compete 
directly with them over limited resources (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).  
The view that PRRPs are mainly supported by the lower social strata is still very 
influential in both academia and public discourse. However, recent developments partly call into 
question this interpretation as many of today’s PRRPs are much more successful than their 
predecessors of the 1990s (Mudde, 2013). With vote shares above 30% for the Swiss People’s 
Party and a neck-and-neck race between the mainstream and the Freedom Party’s candidate for 
the Austrian presidency in 2016, it seems misleading to stress the low social status of PRRP 
supporters any longer. More recent international comparative studies have already acknowledged 
these new conditions and report that middle-educated voters are also very much attracted by 
PRRPs while only a university degree still seems to be a line of educational separation (Rydgren, 
2008). With regard to household income, several studies have also claimed that certain high-
income natives are especially unwilling to support the redistribution of wealth from natives to 
foreigners as they might be burdened with the lion’s share of this through higher tax contributions 
(Burgoon et al., 2012).  
Turning to previous findings on the role of the socio-economic variables for AfD support, 
genuine scientific contributions are rare and rely exclusively on data from the AfD’s first 
Bundestag election of 2013 (Schmitt-Beck, 2014; Berbuir et al., 2015; Schwarzbözl and Fatke 
2016), on the party’s first European parliament election of 2014 (Lewandowsky et al. 2015), or 
on sub-national elections (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2017). Except gender, none of these studies report 
noteworthy socio-economic effects, but as the AfD recently has undergone significant 
programmatic changes, the currency of these findings might be questioned. Besides the gender 
effect, and as indicated by several sub national election results, the only consistent finding is that 
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the AfD gains more support in the Eastern than in the Western part of Germany. Whether these 
regional differences in its support can be related to differences in the populations’ socio-
economic structures, political attitudes or economic and political contexts, is a question 
repeatedly asked, but so far these regional differences have not been analysed in a sophisticated 
way.  
 
Policy preferences and protest motives 
Besides socio-economic variables, support for PRRPs has mostly been explained by three clusters 
of politically relevant attitudes: policy preferences with regard to immigration, preferences with 
regard to the economy, and protest motives. In fact, many authors claim that such attitudes are 
much more important drivers of PRRP support than socio-economic status (Van der Brug et al., 
2005), or they assume that certain social strata are more likely to hold a distinct combination of 
attitudes, which then explains their support for PRRPs (Kitschelt, 2007).  
Starting with immigration, the most consistent finding in PRRP research is that the 
supporters of the extreme right are very critical of it, especially so if immigration stems from 
poorer, ethnically different and, most importantly, Muslim countries (Rydgren 2008; Arzheimer 
2008; Ceobanu & Escandell 2010). This critique is motivated by both cultural as well as 
economic concerns about the consequences of immigration for the receiving countries. With 
regard to cultural motivations, many PRRP supporters seem to be motivated by a mixture of 
xenophobia, racism and, most importantly, ethno-pluralism – the belief that in order to preserve 
the unique national cultures of different people, they have to be kept separate (Betz & Johnson, 
2004). While Rydgren (2008) convincingly argues that these culturally related attitudes are 
themselves somehow related, but should be distinguished by their different effects on PRRP 
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support, for the sake of our interest it seems sufficient to state that PRRP supporters are very 
critical of any policy that increases the number of immigrants to their country.  
While the relevance of immigration-related attitudes is unanimously shared in the PRRP 
literature, the relevance of economic and social policy preferences is much debated. The lingering 
question here is whether PRRP supporters are solely motivated by the issue of immigration or if 
they also hold certain economy-related issue preferences which distinguish them from other 
voters. Three theoretical positions can be identified. First, most authors argue that economic 
issues are of little relevance for PRRP supporters or for the parties themselves, which they see 
motivated mainly by a nationalist ideology (Mudde, 2007: 119). This framing strategy is said to 
allow PRRPs to raise support from both economic right- and left-leaning voters, as they 
downplay economic issues in favour of their anti-immigration agenda (Ivarsflaten, 2005). While 
this is seen as a very promising electoral approach in the short term (Rovny, 2013), in the long 
term economic issues might become very problematic for PRRPs as their support base is 
internally divided, especially with regard to class-based questions of taxation and redistribution 
between poorer and better-off natives (blinded for review). Second, earlier contributions pointed 
out that PRRPs were not interested only in culturally related issues but also in economic 
questions. One of the most prominent advocates of this view was Herbert Kitschelt (1995), who 
argued that the electoral success of PRRPs hinged on a combination of nationalism and laissez-
faire economic policies aiming at less economic redistribution, lower taxation, reduced welfare 
expenditure and welfare chauvinism (see also Betz, 1994). Third, and in sharp contrast to 
Kitschelt, several recent studies now present PRRPs as the new working-class parties, showing 
that these traditionally pro-welfare voters are already the most important group among PRRP 
supporters in many countries (Aichholzer et al., 2014; Betz, 2002; Ignazi, 2003; Schumacher & 
Kersbergen, 2016).  
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While the theoretical assumptions about the economic preferences of PRRP supporters are 
thus very mixed, some recent studies in comparative political economy have made noteworthy 
efforts to bring these views together. Theoretically borrowing from comparative welfare state 
research, three statements can be derived that will also guide our analysis. First, PRRP supporters 
are surely driven by welfare chauvinist attitudes for both cultural as well as economic reasons – a 
very consistent finding (Schumacher & Kersbergen, 2016; Ennser-Jedenastik 2016). Second, 
many PRRP voters will also be highly critical of programmes which they suspect 
disproportionately benefit immigrants. This argument stems from the US where support for the 
social assistance parts of the welfare regime are strongly linked to attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities (Gilens, 1999; Fox, 2004). Not only are recipients of social assistance seen as 
undeserving, the willingness to redistribute money from the rich white majority to the less well-
off minorities via tax-funded welfare programmes is also very limited (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). 
While many recent studies report a similar relationship for Western Europe (Senik et al., 2008; 
Stichnoth & Van der Straeten, 2013) and for Germany in particular (Goldschmidt, 2015; blinded 
for review), we expect AfD supporters to be critical of welfare programmes directed at the lowest 
social strata. Third, social insurance programmes that protect from so-called life-cycle risks, such 
as ageing and illness, enjoy much higher support from voters (see Jensen, 2012; Roosma et al., 
2013). Life-cycle policies concern groups that Europeans overwhelmingly see as more deserving 
than the poor and the unemployed (van Oorschot, 2006) and most people generally hope to 
benefit from these policy areas later in life. Conversely, immigrants are indeed under-represented 
among the old and the sick (Brücker et al., 2002) and thus any suspicion among ethnic majority 
citizens that immigrants benefit disproportionately should be much lower for life-cycle policies. 
Theoretically, there also is reason to expect that the difference between class-redistributive and 
life-cycle welfare preferences is most pronounced in Germany, as the social insurance 
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programmes of the conservative welfare regime are known for their limited redistribution 
between classes (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
Finally, PRRP supporters are seen as generally distrustful of both mainstream politicians 
and institutions and therefore are attracted by the populist rhetoric of the radical right (Kitschelt, 
2002; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). Whether this distrust is caused by 
their belief in the arrogant, corrupt and elitist character of mainstream politicians or simply by the 
unresponsiveness of the political system towards the distinct policy demands of PRRP supporters, 
is thereby an open question. This is exemplified by a major debate about the protest motivation of 
PRRP supporters (see reviews in Arzheimer, 2008; Van der Brug et al., 2000). From one 
perspective, PRRP supporters are not motivated by substantive policy preferences but by 
emotional and irrational feelings of dissatisfaction. Their vote for PRRPs is thus ‘a vote against 
things’ and is used instrumentally to show their discontent for ‘those up there’. The second 
perspective questions this line of reasoning and points to the distinct policy preferences of PRRP 
supporters, who make their protest related to their right-wing ideology, as discussed above.. 
Whatever the relationship is between rational policy and irrational protest motivations, the 
literature suggests that we include measures of generalised political distrust when analysing 
support for the PRRPs. 
Previous findings on the political attitudes of AfD supporters are burdened by the same 
problems already discussed in the role of socio-economic factors. However, these findings do 
seem to fit important assumptions made in the literature about PRRP support. Not only are AfD 
supporters very critical of the recent immigration and especially the asylum policies of Germany 
(Schmitt-Beck 2017), they also hold more negative views on immigrants, especially Muslim 
immigrants, than voters of other parties (Berbuir et al., 2015). So far, empirical findings on the 
economic preferences of AfD voters – beside welfare chauvinism – are lacking. The only 
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exception here is the study by Schwarzbözl and Fatke (2016), indicating that right-wing 
economic preferences played a role for AfD support in 2013 when the party offered a very 
economy-related, Eurosceptic electoral manifesto. Regarding protest motives, AfD voters do not 
feel represented by the great coalition of established parties led by chancellor Angela Merkel 
(Schwarzbözl and Fatke 2016) and also distrust German media, especially when it comes to news 
regarding the misbehavior of asylum seekers (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2017). 
Socio-economic and political context 
Contextual variables such as a population’s ethnic composition and economic conditions are 
often taken into account to explain variations in PRRP support between countries (Arzheimer, 
2009; Golder, 2003) or between regions inside one country (Ford et al., 2012). In order to answer 
the question of why such variables may be of importance in explaining radical right support, we 
can build on group threat theory and realistic conflict theory (Forbes, 1997; Quillian, 1995) on 
the one hand, and contact theory (Allport, 1954) on the other hand.  
 Starting with the conflict-laden assumptions, group threat theories argue that the in-group 
of native voters feels superior to the subordinated out-group of immigrants and believes that 
public resources should be exclusively reserved for in-group members. Immigrants or asylum 
seekers claiming these formerly exclusive benefits reinforce the economic as well as the cultural 
threats associated with out-group members, which in turn increases the natives’ support for 
PRRPs in order to restrict inter-ethnic competition. Two kinds of causes are expected to increase 
group threat and resource conflicts (Quillian, 1995). The first is the size of the subordinated out-
group; larger out-groups increase the competition for scarce resources. The second cause is 
related to economic conditions; the threat that natives associate with increasing numbers of 
immigrants might be more intense in times of economic hardship simply because competition for 
public resources is felt more acutely. Furthermore, we might expect multiplicative effects of out-
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group size and economic hardship, as both variables should increase how threatened native voters 
feel when confronted with immigration (Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006).  
 Another popular theory contradicts such conflict-laden assumptions and focuses on 
natives’ prejudices rather than on economic competition: contact theory (Allport, 1954). This 
theory argues that intense interactions between members of different ethnic groups will reduce 
prejudice and xenophobia as firsthand information about ethnic out-group members becomes 
available. On the native voters’ side, contact should also reduce both economic and cultural 
concerns about immigrants. As the chance for personal contact between natives and immigrants 
is arguably higher in areas with many out-group members, both the proportion of immigrants and 
asylum seekers of the total population should reduce natives’ concerns and thereby also reduce 
their support for PRRPs. Theoretically, this effect should be independent of the wider economic 
situation. 
Beside economic context, previous studies also have highlighted the relevance of PRRP’s 
Political Opportunity Structures (POS) for their electoral fortunes. The basic idea here is that 
PRRPs, like all other parties, have to compete for votes and this competition takes place in a 
specific context, defined by the electoral strategies adopted by mainstream parties and the 
institutional setting, most importantly the electoral system. While POS-arguments are 
prominently discussed in cross-national studies on PRRP support (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, 
van der Brug et al. 2005), such arguments might seem as irrelevant for explaining PRRP support 
in a cross-sectional, one country perspective. The very reason for this is that variables of national 
electoral competition do not vary among the sub-national units of analysis.  
However, there is one very specific POS-related argument discussed for the German 
context. Studies addressing the history of minor German Extreme Right Parties during the 1960s 
and 1990s, repeatedly stress the argument that there are some German regions with a strong 
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tradition of support for such parties – be it for the National Democratic Party of Germany, the 
German People's Union, or the Republicans. Ultimately, these regional trajectories have even 
been connected to the NSDAP strongholds of the 1930s (Falter 1980; Niedermayer 1990; 
Winkler 1994). While these studies could often not build upon statistical analyses, the continuity 
argument is also theoretically a bit vague. The common line of reasoning seems to be a socio-
structural argument, pointing to the relevance of contextual factors as the dominance of rural-
economy, the lack of trade unions, and the number of Protestant voters for the regional success of 
the political Extreme Right. Translated into our analytical model, the continuity argument might 
therefore relate to the socio-demographics of individual supporters (e.g. more blue-color workers 
live in the region), or to socio-demographic contextual effects (e.g. economic conditions). 
However, and even controlled for these variables, there might still be regions with a more 
favorable right-wing political climate, either due to the long-term party alignments of voters 
towards parties of the Extreme Right (and now towards the AfD), or due to long-term social 
networks as clubs, local politicians, or local church organizations providing a more xenophobic 
and cultural conservative public climate (see Schwander and Manow 2017). In the tradition of 
previous research on the Extreme Right in Germany, we will thus account for the regional 
political context in our analysis of AfD support.  
Turning to previous interpretations of the relevance of the socio-economic context for 
AfD support, conflict, but especially contact arguments, have both been stressed. Regarding 
economic conditions, many observers claim that the AfD gains disproportionate support in 
regions with problematic economic conditions (Schmitt-Beck 2014), which, from a national 
perspective, are often located in the eastern part of Germany (Schmitt-Beck 2017). In contrast to 
theoretical expectations, however, these are regions with very low numbers of foreigners. 
Therefore, contact arguments, especially, have been stressed by German media in order to 
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explain the disproportionately high support for the AfD in Eastern Germany (for many: FAZ 
online, 2016). With regard to the role of the long-term political context, we are not aware of any 
analyses addressing this argument empirically.   
Data and Methods 
In order to analyse the support base of the AfD, we make use of an online survey conducted in 
May 2016 (blinded for review) based on a nuanced quota sample from volunteers. This survey 
was initially designed to analyse the welfare state preferences of Germans and therefore provides 
very detailed information on the socio-economic profile and the economic attitudes of the more 
than 2,000 respondents. Another advantage is that all respondents can be located in their postcode 
area, allowing us to measure our contextual-level variables at this fine-grained level. Moreover, 
the data were collected as part of a panel survey. While we do not have information about the 
dependent AfD variable at t1 we can still use the panel structure to regress AfD preferences in 
May 2016 on all the time-variant independent variables (attitudes) measured in May 2015, when 
the first wave was carried out. As we shall discuss, this has certain advantages. Moreover, a slight 
disadvantage is that some well-known drivers of support for extreme right parties are missing, 
e.g. critique of the EU and religiosity. Also, with regard to policy preferences concerning 
immigration, we have to rely on support for the idea of political asylum and welfare chauvinism, 
as we lack more detailed information on preferences with regard to immigration and integration 
policies. However, as the survey provides the most up-to-date sample for analysing AfD support, 
the benefits clearly outweigh these limitations. 
Starting with the dependent variable AfD support, we use an item asking respondents how 
likely is it that they will ever vote for the AfD party. Respondents could indicate their support on 
a scale from 0 (not likely at all) to 10 (very likely). They also had the chance to indicate that they 
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have never heard of this party before.
3
 This variable was originally developed by van der Eijk et 
al. (2006). It has several  advantages for our analysis: (a) it allows the meaningful statistical 
analysis of preferences towards a smaller party as almost all respondents give information about 
themselves and the AfD, (b) The variable can be treated at a metric scale that reflects the idea of 
individual utilities directly measured rather than estimated by discrete-choice models, (c) 
respondents find it easier to admit a higher voting propensity for an ideologically more extremist 
party than admitting to be voting for that party, thus reducing the validity problem associated 
with social desirability. Altogether, slightly more than 60% of all respondents report that they 
would never vote for the AfD, a proportion we do not find for any other German party, besides 
the extreme right NPD with more than 80%. However, about 18% of all respondents chose a 
value of more than 5, indicating the potential supporter base of the AfD party in mid-2016. 
With regard to the variables defining the socio-economic profile of respondents, we 
include gender, age (including age-squared), as well as formal education measured in three 
categories (low, medium and high). Concerning occupation, we test for the assumption that AfD 
supporters can mainly be found among blue-collar workers and the self-employed. The financial 
situation of respondents is measured by their personal income in twelve categories. Other 
financially relevant variables have been recoded as dummy variables, recording if the respondent 
currently receives one of three welfare benefits (social assistance, unemployment benefits, or a 
pension), or if he fears becoming unemployed or unable to pay for bare necessities in the next 12 
months. Finally, we control for whether the respondent was born abroad, spending his adolescent 
                                                          
3
 Only 2.5% of the sample chose this option for the AfD, whereas 21.7 % did not know ALFA, the splinter 
party founded by Bernd Lucke. 
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years in the former GDR or in Eastern Germany after reunification.
4
 Being born and socialised in 
Western Germany serves as the reference category.  
Turning to political attitudes regarding immigration, we rely on a question asking if the 
respondent sees the right of political asylum offered to foreigners in Germany to be a ‘good’ or a 
‘not good’ idea, or if he has no opinion on this issue. We focus on the ‘not good’ answers 
(18.4%) and create a dummy variable against political asylum. While this is arguably a very 
restrictive measure of immigration-related sentiments, at the time of the survey questions of 
asylum were very topical because of the unprecedented inflow of asylum seekers between June 
2015 and March 2016.   
With regard to economic preferences, we create a variable defining welfare chauvinism. For this 
variable, respondents could indicate when they want to see immigrants being entitled to the same 
welfare rights as the native population: ‘immediately on arrival’; ‘after one year of residence’; 
‘after one year of working and paying taxes’; ‘after becoming German citizens’, or ‘never’. We 
create two dummies for the last two categories, which together included 35% of all respondents, 
and use all other answers as the baseline category. General welfare-related preferences are 
defined by two additional indices: class-redistributive welfare support, as measured by the mean 
answer to two questions asking whether the respondent wants the state to pay more for ‘the poor’ 
and ‘the unemployed’, and life-cycle welfare support which asks related questions about ‘the old’ 
and ‘the sick’.
5
 We measure the level of political distrust with an item asking respondents for 
their degree of trust in the media and an index resulting from a principal component analysis, 
                                                          
4
 For these variables, respondents were asked where they spent their schooling period between the ages of 
12 and 16. 
5
 We decided not to include respondents’ left- or right-leaning self-placements on our list of political 
attitudes. This variable is closely related to AfD support, but we see it hiding more than it uncovers, 
especially with regard to the analysis of PRRP supporters (see also Lubbers et al. 2002).  
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which records their trust in political institutions such as political parties, the federal parliament 
and government.  
In order to account for the socio-economic context, five variables enter the equation. 
Central for group conflict explanations are the inflow of asylum seekers during the last month 
and during the last year, measured by absolute numbers for each 1,000 inhabitants. These two 
variables measure these short- and medium-term factors on the sub national Länder level (for all: 
Federal Statistical Office, 2017). To account for the economic context, we include the 
unemployment rate (as a percentage of the working-age population) and a purchase power index 
brought in relation to the overall German mean (=100). Both variables and the share of foreigners 
(the measure for long-term immigration) were supplied by a commercial data provider and were 
measured at the level of postal code areas. Finally, we include the vote share of Die Republikaner 
– a traditional party of the extreme right – in the 1994 federal election (Federal Statistical Office, 
1997) to account for the long-term regional political context. This variable is broken down to the 
level of postal code areas and we chose the 1994 election because today’s postal code areas were 
first introduced in the early 1990s. The descriptions of all variables are provided in the appendix 
(Table 1). 
The regression analysis consists of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust 
standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. The models are basically 2016 cross-sections, 
but we also present a model regressing AfD’s support in 2016 to lagged independent variables 
measured in 2015, when the first wave of our panel survey was conducted. As both approaches 
lead to very comparable results, we see that knowing someone’s long established attitudes predict 
the AfD vote propensity.
6
  
                                                          
6
 We ran additional analyses with random intercepts for Bundesland-groups, also correcting for 




We provide our empirical results in two steps, first presenting the models for AfD support in 
2016 (models 1-3), and then presenting a regression of this support data on the individual-level 
independent variables measured in 2015 (model 4). All models are reported on in Table 1. 
  
Table 1: Results of OLS Regressions 
 Model Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 4 
Individual-level variables     
 
Socio-economic variables 










 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education: low (ref.)     
Education: medium 0.224 0.415 0.432
*
 0.411 
 (0.348) (0.060) (0.049) (0.144) 
Education: high -0.435 0.042 0.111 0.192 
 (0.074) (0.849) (0.615) (0.497) 
Income  0.087
*
 0.055 0.053 0.063 
 (0.041) (0.158) (0.174) (0.220) 
Age in yrs 0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.034 
 (0.552) (0.496) (0.471) (0.389) 
Age²  -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.373) (0.856) (0.840) (0.656) 
Adolescence: West (ref.)     
Adolescence: abroad 0.913
*
 0.532 0.600 1.064 
 (0.044) (0.203) (0.154) (0.065) 
Adolescence: GDR 0.513
*
 0.236 0.310 -0.014 






 (0.008) (0.059) (0.039) (0.091) 
Occupation: all other (ref.)     
Occupation:  -0.163 -0.046 -0.046 0.178 
self- employed (0.615) (0.875) (0.875) (0.625) 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the residual similarity of the dependent variable is negligible, thus allowing to present the simpler 
models here. Also, we ran two-stage Heckman selection models to check whether the dynamics 
that discriminate between those who could never imagine themselves voting for the AfD (a 0 on 
the dependent variable) and all others are the same as the dynamics that discriminate between 1 
and 10 on the dependent variable. These results show that they are, so that the two-stage 
approach is not necessary. 
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Occupation: -0.391 -0.528 -0.503 -1.091
*
 
blue collar (0.251) (0.128) (0.147) (0.012) 
Receives welfare  0.185 0.111 0.181 0.243 
benefits (0.405) (0.580) (0.369) (0.350) 
Risk of poverty  0.323
*
 0.151 0.142 0.274
*
 
 (0.001) (0.083) (0.102) (0.014) 







 (0.014) (0.027) (0.022) (0.369) 
 
Political attitudes  
 
    







redistributive welfare   (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Support for life-cycle welfare   0.093
*
 0.089 0.066 
  (0.047) (0.058) (0.270) 







  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Welfare chauvinism: low (ref.)     







  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 







  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 







  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Trust in the media   -0.140 -0.134 0.136 
  (0.191) (0.209) (0.380) 
Contextual-level variables     












Purchase power    0.014 0.010 
   (0.450) (0.671) 
Unemployment rate    -0.010 -0.013
*
 
   (0.076) (0.044) 


















 (0.042) (0.006) (0.029) (0.038) 
N 2001 2001 2001 1348 
R² 0.041 0.209 0.217 0.195 
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OLS regressions with robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. P values 
of two-sided test that beta = 0 in parentheses. The asterisk signals p-values <.05. The 
models also include a flag variable for cases where missing income values was 
imputed with the median. Model 4 contains attitudinal variables in bold that are lagged 
by one year. Model 4 is only estimated for those who were in both waves. 
 
We start by focusing on the individual-level socio-economic status of AfD supporters (model 1). 
Here, first of all gender effects are relevant: men support the AfD much more than women – a 
finding reported for nearly all of Western European PRRPs. Also, political socialisation plays a 
role in AfD support. Compared with the reference category of people born in Western Germany, 
people raised in the former GDR (Eastern Germany) are more open to the AfD party, an effect 
that lessens for people who were socialised in Eastern Germany after reunification. Also, people 
born outside Germany are far more likely to show AfD support. Immigrants supporting a party 
known for its anti-immigrant programme might at first seem counterintuitive, but recent analysis 
indicates that immigrants from Russia and some former states of the Soviet Union – the so-called 
‘late re-settlers’- show disproportionally high levels of support for the AfD (see blinded for 
review). While we have no information on the respondents’ country of origin in our data, we 
strongly expect that AfD support is strongest among the group of Russian-speaking immigrants 
with German citizenship, as AfD advertises widely among this voter group, for instance with an 
election manifesto written in Russian.   
Besides these gender and socialisation effects, it is hard to come up with a unified picture 
of AfD support resulting from other socio-economic variables. Neither respondents’ age nor their 
occupation seem to be factors affecting AfD‘s support. Similarly, neither working-class 
respondents nor the self-employed show a higher probability to vote for the AfD – if anything, 
the support of blue-collar workers is lower than that of all other occupations. Education just fails 
to be a significant factor, but AfD support seems to be more concentrated among respondents 
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with medium- but without university education. Regarding the economic situation of AfD 
supporters, the findings are mixed. On the one hand, high personal income increases support for 
the AfD, with neither the unemployed nor respondents receiving social assistance or pensions 
showing stronger support for the party. Thus, AfD support is not more common among those who 
are dependent on the welfare state. On the other hand, AfD sympathisers report stronger fears of 
future economic decline, i.e. they see the risk of becoming unemployed or not being able to pay 
for the expenses of everyday life. In summary, economic status seems to be playing a role in AfD 
support, but sympathisers seem to be motivated much more by their fears of social relegation 
than by their low objective social status. Finally, please note that all individual level socio-
demographics together (including risk perceptions) result in an R² of only 4.1%. Given the still 
prominent interpretation to see the rise of the AfD accompanied to political-economic factors 
(e.g. the support by working-class voters), we have to conclude that even combined such 
variables are of very limited relevance for predicting AfD support. 
In model 2, we include items that account for both policy preferences as well as political 
distrust in our list of variables. Together, these variables include very strong effects of the 
propensity to vote for the AfD, boosting the R² value to 20.9%. Also, the inclusion of political 
attitudes renders the effects of being born-abroad and raised in Eastern Germany before or after 
reunification insignificant, leaving only the perceived risk of becoming unemployed as 
significantly correlated with AfD support. Let us first look at the direct, and in a way, not very 
surprising results. Voters who believe that the right to political asylum is a bad idea, and who are 
medium or strong welfare chauvinists, are much more likely to vote for the AfD. Cultural beliefs 
expressed as anti-immigrant sentiments are thus powerful predictors for AfD support – a finding 
resembling findings for PRRP support in other European countries.  
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Coming to the economic preferences of AfD voters, a more nuanced interpretation is 
needed. On the one hand, even one year after Bernd Lucke’s split from the party, the AfD still 
has a strong economically conservative base next to its national-traditionalistic core supporters. 
More precisely, AfD supporters are very critical of class-based redistribution to the poor and to 
the unemployed – an effect that not only survives all other controls but also belongs to the biggest 
groups of maximum effects (maximum absolute effect of 1.2) followed by that of political trust 
(maximum absolute effect of 1.9), the rejection of right to political asylum (1.9) and welfare 
chauvinism (2.0). Thus, and in contrast to many other PRRPs in Western Europe (Ivarsflaten, 
2005), the AfD is not faced with a political support base that is divided over the issue of 
economic redistribution. On the other hand, life-cycle welfare programmes such as pensions and 
health care are not criticised by AfD sympathisers. Thus, AfD voters are not generally opponents 
of the German welfare state but they are hesitant to support only those parts of it which are 
targeted towards the lowest social strata, many of whom are immigrants and, increasingly, 
asylum seekers. While these findings are in line with the experiences of race-based welfare 
support originating from the US-centred literature (Fox, 2004), they point to the need for 
differentiating between distinct dimensions of welfare support when analysing support for 
Western European PRRPs – an issue which has received limited empirical interest so far.  
Coming to political dissatisfaction, the findings are again in line with theoretical 
expectations. AfD supporters are far more critical of the governing grand coalition led by Angela 
Merkel, of the federal parliament and of political parties in general. These effects survive the 
inclusion of policy preferences and point to an emotionally driven component of AfD support 
next to sympathy stemming from rational policy interest. However, this is not to say that the vote 
for the AfD is predominantly driven by insubstantial protest against the political elite. In contrast, 
27 
 
cultural and economically right-wing political attitudes, and a critique of immigration and asylum 
rights, make up the list of the most relevant individual explanatory variables in mid-2016.  
Finally, we add contextual variables to our list of explanations. Controlling for individual 
level variables, the AfD does not enjoy higher support in better- or worse-off regions. Also, 
neither the number of asylum seekers nor the number of foreigners is significantly correlated with 
AfD support. We also tested for several interaction effects between economic conditions and the 
number of asylum seekers and foreigners, comparing the nested models with and without product 
terms of the interaction by means of an F-test. This approach yielded no statistical improvement. 
The only contextual variable playing a role for AfD support in 2016 is the regional history of 
(extreme) right-wing voting in Germany: the electoral district results of the Die Republikaner in 
the 1994 Bundestag election. This variable is highly significant and is positively correlated to 
AfD support more than two decades later. Thus, there seem to be some local contexts in Germany 
in which extreme and radical right-wing voting is more common and probably more socially 
acceptable than in other contexts. This effect is not mediated by the individual-level variables, 
meaning that it exists on top of them, and can be partially due to the same voters having 
preferences on the right in 1994 and 2016 and still living in the same area. However, additional 
analyses (available upon request) demonstrate that the effect is also positive and even stronger for 
young voters who were not eligible to vote in 1994. Thus, there must be additional mechanisms 
at work, potentially a local nationalist culture or maybe differences in organizational 
infrastructure like clubs or churches shaping local political preferences. 
To end our empirical analysis, we suggest that cross-sectional models of voting intentions 
often meet both theoretical and methodologically motivated criticism for ‘explaining attitudes 
with attitudes’. To address this point, we can make use of the panel design of our survey, 
regressing the political support for the AfD in 2016 on the individual level variables measured in 
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May 2015 – that is, before the German refugee crisis that started in July 2015. In this way, we 
can limit both the effects of media framing and the possibility that AfD support results in more 
right-wing political attitudes rather than being caused by them. We present the results of this 
specification in model 4, which is based only on respondents who participated in both phases of 
the panel surveys, dropping their number from 2.001 to 1.348. In short, model 4 leads to the same 
basic findings as the cross-sections, i.e. the political and social attitudes measured in 2015 have 
very comparable effects on AfD support as in 2016. This means that the AfD builds on attitudes 
that already existed. This does not mean that the party does not change attitudes as well, but the 
AfD piggy-backs its support on long-term and rather stable political preferences, in particular 
around cultural and economic conservatism.  
Conclusions 
Using a recent nationwide survey, we have provided the first analysis of the supporter base of the 
AfD since the party’s split and its ideological re-orientation in mid-2015. Deriving our 
hypotheses on AfD sympathisers from the comparative literature of PRRPs in Western Europe, 
our empirical findings strongly indicate that the electoral success of Germany’s newest right-
wing party is largely due to the same set of socio-economic, attitudinal and contextual factors 
proven so important to explain the fortunes of PRRPs in other countries. In summary, right-wing 
political attitudes concerning immigration, political dissatisfaction, fears of personal economic 
decline, as well as gender and socialisation effects, are the most relevant explanatory variables. 
Because of this, there is little support for recent interpretations which suggest that the rise of the 
AfD is the result of political protest against mainstream parties alone. Rather, our analyses 
strongly suggest that the party has already managed to form a coherent supporter base motivated 
by both cultural and economically right-wing policy preferences, as well as being supported by 
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part of the German immigrant population itself. Also, long-term regional legacies of support for 
far-right parties are decisive for AfD support in 2016. Compared with other Western European 
PRRPs, these characteristics are rather unusual and we end our discussion by describing the 
potential of their mid- to long-term impact on the electoral fortunes of the party. 
 Starting with economic preferences, AfD sympathisers are not only pronounced welfare 
chauvinists, but they are also highly critical of class-based redistribution via welfare and taxation. 
Thus, the party does not seem to be plagued by an internally divided electorate with regard to 
general redistribution. While such divisions seem to be a vulnerability of many PRRPs – 
especially when those parties enter government – the supporters of the AfD are much more 
motivated by economic concerns than one might expect when compared with other PRRPs. 
Given that the AfD started with a very market-liberal programme and high-ranking personnel 
only five years ago, the role of economic motivations for their supporters might come as little 
surprise. However, since 2013 the party has more than doubled its electoral base and the main 
proponents of its market-liberal agenda has left the AfD after severe internal disputes over the 
issue of immigration. To find that AfD supporters in 2016 are still motivated by right-wing 
economic preferences therefore is noteworthy. Regarding the long-term prospects of the party, 
this might become a major electoral advantage. With regard to the party’s profile of welfare 
reform, we expect the AfD to support retrenchment of at least those parts of the German welfare 
state that address the least well-off. In contrast, our findings do not support the view that the 
PRRPs would support cuts in the areas of pensions or health care – a pattern comparable to the 
Swiss context (Afonso & Papadopoulos 2015). 
 Concerning the support for the AfD of people born abroad, we are not aware of a similar 
pattern in any other of Western Europe’s PRRPs. We strongly believe that this support is from 
Germany’s second largest immigrant group: those people from the former Soviet Union who 
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entered Germany during the early 1990s and were immediately granted voting rights because of 
their German descent. So far, these ‘late re-settlers’ have shown extraordinarily high support for 
the Christian Democrats although they were not directly addressed by this party in its electoral 
campaigns. Recently, the AfD has put considerable effort into directly addressing this voter 
group, promising to improve Germany’s relationships towards Russia, which is currently under 
considerable stress due to the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. If the AfD succeeds in these efforts 
– and our data reveals that it is on track to do so – it might be able to align parts of this group of 
nearly 2.5 million voters by appealing to their ethnic identity.  
 Finally, our results concerning the role of the long-term regional political context calls for 
further investigation. While this continuity argument has a long tradition in the German literature 
on far-right parties, we were surprised to see that the electoral results of the Republicans in 1994 
are an important predictor of AfD support in 2016 - even if individual-level variables are 
controlled for. Indeed, this variable is a much better predictor than both economic conditions and 
the number of foreigners or asylum seekers living in a region. Revealing the causal mechanism 
behind this strong correlation is well beyond what our data allows but we could already rule out 
the possibility that it is due to the same voters who supported the Republicans in 1994 and now 
support the AfD. This leaves the existence of long-term regional networks providing a favorable 
opportunity structure for cultural conservative and anti-immigrant parties as the most plausible 
explanation. How these networks look like, how they function, and which actors are involved, 
constitutes a promising avenue for further research. The theoretical insights of such studies would 
also be an asset for the international-comparative discussion on PRRP-voters, in which such kind 
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Description of the data set 
The unit of analysis are individuals surveyed in 2016 on all variables and in 2015 for some 
independent variables. The sample is a nuanced quota sample from the volunteer panel of 
(blinded for review) to reflect the overall composition of the adult population in terms of age 
groups, gender, education and Bundesland.  
We merged the individual data set with contextual data at the postcode level (PLZ-5) with data 
from a commercial data company (blinded for review). There were more than 8000 5-digit 
postcodes in Germany in 2016. The number of registered inhabitants varied between 0 (industrial 
area) and more than 58,000 with a mean of about 9,800 (see OpenStreetMap 2018). Most 
respondents in our data were the only people from their indicated catchment area. 21 individuals 
are associated with a non-existent postcode as it is against the company policy of (blinded for 
review) to check this voluntary information. For these 21 individuals, we imputed the mean value 
of the postcode variables under the reasonable assumption that their probability not giving the 
right information is not associated with the values on these variables.  
At the postcode level, we manually created one variables ourselves, namely the electoral district 
result of the 1994 Bundestag election in the district that is uniquely associated geographically 
with the postcode-5 in 2016. For 234 individuals, we could not create the value as there was no 
unique electoral district associated with that postcode or because the postcode was not existent. 
Here, we imputed the mean value under the assumption that the nature of missingness is not 
related to the true value on that variable. 
Finally, we added two variables about asylum-seeker applications per 1,000 inhabitants that were 
only available at the Bundesland level from the Federal Statistical Office (2017). 
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Table A.1: Descriptives 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Comments 
Dependent variable 
     AfD support 2.17 3.36 0.00 10.00 
 Socio-economic variables 
    Female 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 Education medium 
(higher than Hauptschule 
and lower than Abitur) 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 Education high (Abitur 
and higher) 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 Income 3.80 2.00 1.00 12.00 
 Income imputed 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 











 Adolescence: abroad 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
 Adolescence: East after 
unification 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
 Adolescence: GDR 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
 Occupation: blue collar  0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
 Occupation: self-
employed 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
 Receives welfare benefits 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
 Risk of poverty 0.94 0.95 0.00 3.00 
 Risk of unemployment 0.58 0.85 0.00 3.00 
 Political attitudes 2016 
     Support for redistributive 
welfare 6.81 2.36 0.00 10.00 
 Support for life-cycle 
welfare 8.31 1.90 0.00 10.00 
 Critical of political 
asylum  0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 Welfare chauvinism: 
medium 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
 Welfare chauvinism: 
high 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
 Trust in political 
institutions 0.00 1.56 -1.83 5.48 
 Trust in media 0.86 0.73 0.00 3.00 
 Critical of political 
asylum  0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 Political attitudes in 2015 
     Support for redistributive 
welfare 6.68 2.33 0.00 10.00 
 Support for life-cycle 





medium 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
 Welfare chauvinism: 
high 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
 Trust in political 
institutions 0.00 1.54 -1.98 5.33 
 Trust in media 0.73 0.68 0.00 3.00 
 Contextual-level variables 
    Asylum seekers per 1000 
inhabitants (last month) 0.74 0.22 0.26 1.77 Federal Statistical Office 2017, Bundesland 
Asylum seekers per 1000 
inhabitants (last year) 6.71 2.35 4.54 13.45 Federal Statistical Office 2017, Bundesland 
Unemployment rate in % 6.80 3.63 0.00 21.95 (blinded for review), PLZ5 level 
Foreign-born population 
in %  7.32 5.05 0.47 36.74 (blinded for review), PLZ5 level 
Purchase power, indexed 
at national mean (=100) 100.11 15.32 66.62 223.96 (blinded for review), PLZ5 level 
Vote share of 
Republikaner in 1994 in 
% 1.91 0.83 0.50 4.41 
Federal Statistical Office (1997), originally 
Electoral district (Wahlkreis) then manually 





OpenStreetMaps 2018, plz-einwohner.xls, available at https://www.suche-
postleitzahl.org/downloads  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
